In this paper we present a structural VAR analysis of monetary policy in Italy. A monetary policy operating regime based on the control of the overnight rate seems to t the data better than alternative quantitative monetary regimes. The model allows us to derive a n o v erall indicator of the monetary policy stance that is able to highlight the major episodes of monetary contraction in the sample. JEL Classi cation: E520.
In Search of Monetary Policy Measures:
The Case of Italy in the 90's 1 Introduction
In the 90's both academics and policymakers have shown a renewed interest in monetary policy and the transmission of monetary impulses to the real economy. 1 This followed the limits to the use of scal policy as a stabilization tool that arose mostly everywhere, often due to the adoption of explicit constraints on the public budget, like the scal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty in Europe or the balanced-budget rules of many US states.
In Europe, another motivation for further investigation of monetary policy has been provided by the EMU project and the related establishment of the European Central Bank. As a consequence, the debate has been naturally directed to the selection of the best monetary policy instruments and operating procedures.
Obviously, measuring" monetary policy becomes a prerequisite for any empirical investigation of the transmission of monetary impulses to the economy. Moreover, a measure of monetary policy should allow to disentangle purely exogenous monetary-policy shocks from the endogenous policy reaction to the business cycle uctuations.
In this paper we present an empirical model of the recent conduct of monetary policy in Italy. We compare di erent monetary regimes de ned by alternative possible operating procedures in a small open-economy framework, thereby extending the approach developed for the US by Bernanke and Mihov 1997a. In particular, by means of a structural vector autoregression, we test whether monetary policy in Italy has been conducted in the 90's by operatively controlling a short-term interest rate or a central-bank money aggregate. The model includes the real exchange rate vis-a-vis Germany among the variables. It is thus possible to evaluate the role of the exchange rate as both a propagation channel of the monetary impulses to the economy and an information variable potentially a ecting the central bank behavior.
The analysis supports the view that the Bank of Italy has been mainly focusing on the targeting of a short-term interest rate the overnight rate.
There is instead very little evidence that the Bank of Italy has been targeting any quantity-based aggregate.
As an additional outcome, the estimated model allows us to construct an indicator of the overall monetary conditions in the economy. We compare this measure with informal, but widely-accepted, views on the recent stance of monetary policy in Italy, and with an alternative monetary condition index" MCI that has been applied in many country studies.
The paper is organized as follows. Given the emphasis on the institutional setting in which monetary policy is conducted, we start with a narrative description of recent monetary policy management in Italy Section 2. In Section 3 an overview of both the related literature and the methodology employed is o ered; readers already acquainted with the use of VARs in monetary policy may skip this section. The empirical model for Italy is described in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the estimation results. In Section 6 we derive a n o v erall measure of the monetary policy stance. Concluding remarks and indications for future research follow.
Monetary Policy Targets, Instruments and
Operating Procedures in Italy: A Narrative Approach
In this section we present a short review of recent monetary history in Italy. More detailed treatments can be found in Caranza and Fazio 1978 , Cotula 1989 , Gaiotti 1992 , Sarcinelli 1995 and Passacantando 1996.
Background
The art of managing monetary policy via market instruments is a quite recent acquisition in the Italian economy. As a matter of fact, only in the last 15 years have the Italian monetary authorities turned to using outright and repurchase open-market operations in the secondary market as the main tool for monetary intervention. Moreover, this happened gradually and as the push represented by the on-going participation to the ERM of the EMS was becoming increasingly evident. In the early years following the 1979 establishment of the EMS, monetary policy in Italy was still conducted mainly through direct administrative controls. These were in turn largely a consequence of the subordinated position that monetary policy had with respect to budgetary policy until 1981, when, with the divorce from the Treasury, the central bank was nally freed from the obligation to buy all unsold government securities on the primary market. Domestic nancial ows were restricted by an extensive use of binding credit ceilings massimale agli impieghi and portfolio quotas of certain types of bonds that banks were obliged to maintain in the asset side of their balance sheets vincoli di portafoglio. In addition, reserve requirements were extremely severe. 2 Domestic nancial markets were kept separated from international markets by imposing comprehensive limits to capital movements. These capital controls helped to insulate the Italian interest rates from international ones, especially in periods between exchange-rate realignments; they were seen as e ective tools for reducing excessive interest-rate volatility, which could have harmed the already di cult nancing of the growing public sector de cits. On the domestic side, the restrictions on nancial ows were also mainly directed to limit the burden of public debt servicing. 3 In the meantime these restrictions also helped control the total expenditure capacity of the economy, which w as still a vivid concern due to the di culties and the balance of payments crises that Italy had experienced in the 70's.
The administrative controls on domestic nancial ows were dismissed in late 1983, when Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the Central bank governor, announced that the Bank of Italy would not consider any longer total domestic credit Credito totale interno as the intermediate target of monetary policy. Since then, monetary policy management gradually but constantly turned to market tools and operations, in a framework characterized by fast technological changes, deep nancial innovation and progressive capital-movement and currency liberalization.
In a rst period, between 1983 and 1986, the Bank of Italy adopted a monetary intermediate target, following other European central banks that had already converted to the 1979 US switch to a monetarist approach with the appointment o f P aul Volcker as the FED Chairman. In presence of high and volatile in ation, the control of a monetary aggregate as M2 was in fact perceived to be the best strategy to reduce the in ation di erential with respect to Germany and other European countries, an ultimate target implied by EMS membership. However, the money-growth target established by the Bank of Italy was neither realized in 1984 nor in 1985 Table 1 , inducing the authorities to announce only a desired band for annual M2 growth in 1986 7-11. 4 In the early years of the EMS, as widely recognized, 5 disin ation in Italy was then mainly led by the real appreciation of the exchange rate obtained by anchoring the currency to the Deutsche Mark DM and not fully accomodating the in ation di erentials via the discrete exchange-rate realignments.
In Table 1 we also report the o cial target for in ation established by the government, 6 as well as its realization. In the mid 80's the introduction and development of new monetary and nancial instruments throughout Europe started to highlight a number of shortcomings linked to money-targeting particularly in the presence of an exchange-rate adjustable peg. The new instruments increased the interestrate elasticity of money demand, and induced higher instability of money demand with respect to domestic income, thereby seriously undermining some of the theoretical assumptions on which an intermediate quantitative targeting approach to monetary policy was based. This process was much slower in Italy than in the UK or the US, therefore allowing the central bank to continue with the use of money-targeting. 7 However, policymakers and academics gradually turned back to consider short-term interest rates as additional reliable indicators of the monetary conditions, as well as the most important channel of transmission of monetary impulses to the real econ- 4 Table 1 shows that even the use of target bands was not always su cient to avoid failures in hitting the target: this happened again in 1989, 1990, 1991 , and again in the recent past. However, as we discuss later, M2 targets were gradually de-emphasized by the end of the 80's. 5 See Giavazzi and Spaventa 1990, Gressani, Guiso and Visco 1988, Arcelli and Di Giorgio 1995, Passacantando 1996. 6 In Italy the annual target for in ation is set by the Government in the Documento di Programmazione Economico-Finanziaria, which has to be presented to the Parliament i n May; the Documento contains mid-term projections for the main scal variables and sets out the Budget De cit GDP objective which has to be implemented by the next Financial Law, due by the end of September. O cially, the Bank of Italy does not announce an independent in ation target, but is responsible for the internal and external stability o f the currency. In periods in which the Government underestimated in ation on purpose, this institutional feature led to con icts between the central bank and the Government. However, many authors support the solution of assigning the responsability for setting the target to the Government, and the responsability for reaching it to the central bank see, for instance, Sarcinelli, 1995. 7 The active role of the Italian monetary authorities in promoting nancial innovation in general, and the functioning of the money market in particular, in these years, must be underlined. On the supply side, for example, new nancial instruments as Treasury bonds either denominated in ECU | CTE | or with in ation-indexed interest rates | CCT were rst introduced by the economic-policy authorities and only later, and as a response to the sharp disintermediation process so induced, followed by nancial innovation originated in the banking sector. omy. In 1988 the central bank consistently increased the use of repurchase open-market operations. At the same time, a screen-based secondary market for government securities MTS was rst designed and nally launched, thus creating the necessary institutional framework for market-based management of monetary policy. 8 Capital controls were also gradually dismissed and some currency liberalization started to take place, relaxing the barriers that had been raised to avoid the integration of domestic nancial markets with foreign ones.
Monetary policy under quasi-xed exchange rates
Since 1988 Italy's stronger commitment to the construction of the European project, as well as the participation in the more rigid ERM that followed the signature of the Basle-Nyborg agreements, had the e ect of enhancing the role of the nominal exchange rate. The latter started to beconsidered as the e ective new intermediate target of monetary policy. This trend was reinforced by the two decisions of the monetary authorities regarding the entrance of the Italian Lira in the narrow band of the ERM January 1990 and the full liberalization of short-term capital movements May 1990. In this framework, money-market interest rates were often used as instruments to guide capital in ows and out ows and to sustain the currency.
In the early 90's, nally, the long-lasting activity of the monetary authorities directed toward the establishment and development of an e cient money market in Italy, w as almost accomplished.
After the already mentioned introduction of the MTS in 1988, the oor price" on all T-Bill issues in the primary market was abolished in 1989. This represented another important step toward the ultimate and clear separation of the responsability for monetary policy and public debt management, with the former assigned to the Bank of Italy and the latter to the Treasury.
Moreover, a screen-based market for interbank deposits was set up in 1990. Transactions in this market were fostered by the contemporaneous revision of the compulsory reserve regime, probably the most relevant institutional change in the last decade as regards liquidity management in the banking sector. The latter, in fact, allowed banks to mobilize required reserves with the sole constraint of maintaining average provisions on a monthly basis.
These changes were aimed at promoting a more liquid monetary market, a necessary prerequisite for the quick transmission of monetary impulses to the nancial sector and the real economy via the whole term-structure of interest rates. However, some important tools of monetary policy, such a s t h e p o w er of modifying reserve requirements or the discount rate, were not yet o cially in the exclusive hands of the central bank. As a matter of fact, the degree of economic independence of the central bank was still low, at least on a de jure basis. 9 It is indeed possible that the recent important steps in the implementation of the current institutional framework for monetary policy were quickened by the credibility problems that sharply emerged as being one of the most relevant components of the crises that led to the exchange rate collapse of September1992. 
The return to managed oating
Although the revision of monetary policy instruments and operating procedures had already been advanced in the last months of ERM participation, there is no doubt that the return to managed oating gave new impetus to the completion of the battery of policy tools that is currently used by the Bank of Italy. The macroeconomic incompatibilites with the DM zone being evident, the dismissal of the exchange rate as an intermediate target led this variable to oat free. In 1993, monetary policy was nally relaxed after the severe contraction of the Summer of 1992 driven by the attempt to defend the exchange rate parity. The sharp devaluation following Black Wednesday pushed exports and was a major determinant of the recovery of GDP dynamics in 1994.
The exchange rate became a relevant channel of transmission of monetary policy, in a framework characterized by the necessity of adjusting the structural scal imbalances of the Italian economy. The 1992-93 recession and the restrictive domestic scal stance had the e ect of limiting the passthrough of exchange rate devaluation to prices. Monetary policy actions turned again toward controlling short-term interest rates with an increasingly explicit emphasis on the nal objective of reducing in ation, 11 even when this might h a v e been in explicit contrast with the objectives of output growth and higher employment.
The higher degree of legal" economic independence obtained by the Bank of Italy between 1992 and 1994, 12 allowed the Bank to improve and develop a set of monetary policy operating procedures which had already been adopted, with minor di erences, in other countries See Borio, 1997 . More precisely, starting in 1993, the Bank of Italy explicitely relies on an interest rates corridor", delimited by two o cially-set rates the discount rate and the rate on xed-term advances. Both movements and changes in the amplitude of the corridor have become a standard signal to the market of the mediumterm orientation of monetary policy. 13 A narrow corridor implies that the monetary authorities are more willing to accept liquidity changes following 11 In many occasions during 1995 and 1996, Governor Fazio stated in public that a cut in the o cial discount rate would follow only after the fall of the in ation rate below a n explicitely-announced threshold. 12 In February 1992, the power to autonomously modify the discount rate was o cially given to the central bank Governor. The discipline of xed-term advances had been reformed in 1991. The Treasury's cash account with the Bank of Italy was abolished in November 1993 and replaced by a new mechanism of explicit temporary cash advances from the Central bank in December. Finally, the power of modifying reserve requirements was assigned solely to the Governor in 1994. 13 See Buttiglione, Del Giovane and Gaiotti 1997. Many di erent indicators of the monetary policy stance have been suggested and used in the literature, after the profession understood that the rate of growth of a monetary aggregate M1, M2 or M3 did not provide su cient information to establish whether a given period was characterized by tight or easy monetary conditions. In the 60's, a series of studies conducted by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, during the keynesianmonetarist debate, suggested that current and lagged money growth were important determinants of output growth. As a consequence, many economists interpreted this evidence as implying that an increase in the rate of growth of a monetary aggregate could be regarded as an expansionary monetary policy. However, an increase in the rate of growth of a monetary aggregate could simply re ect an increase in money demand, rather than indicate an expansionary monetary policy. 15 Exactly the same problem a ects the choice of interest rates as monetary policy indicators. Indeed, higher interest rates could be induced by contractions in money supply as well as by increases in money demand. This simple observation is behind the so-called liquidity puzzle" Leeper and Gordon, 1992. 16 Given the di culties linked to the identi cation of demand and supply shocks in the money market, Friedman and Schwartz 1963 turned to a completely di erent approach, based on a comprehensive study of a large set of economic data over a long period of time. They tried to single out those historical episodes in which expansions or contractions in M2 could not be considered to have been driven by demand shocks. The authors concluded that this kind of narrative approach could beuseful to identify periods in which monetary policy is e ectively tight or easy. More recently, this approach has been re-proposed by Romer and Romer 1989 , who focused on the second post-war period. They did not look at time series, but undertook the dicult task of reading all the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meetings, in order to establish directly from policy-makers' statements the periods in which the orientation of monetary policy turned contractionary. They singled out six periods of tight monetary policy, which have become known as the Romer dates". However, their approach is obviously limited by inherent subjectivity. Moreover, it does not allow to disentangle between endogenous" and exogenous" components of monetary policy and pays no attention to periods of expansionary monetary policy. The latter problem was addressed by Boschen and Mills 1991, who extended the Romers' work in order to be able to classify each month in the sample as a period in which monetary policy was very tight", tight", neutral", easy" or very easy".
The narrative approach was not the only route taken by researchers in order to identify a measure of the monetary policy stance and to investigate whether monetary policy induces real e ects on the economy. Some authors, focusing on the more or less precise knowledge of the central bank operating procedures, chose to consider as an indicator of the monetary policy stance a particular variable over which the central bank is assumed to have e ective control in the money market. This variable can be either a short-term interest rate or a central-bank money aggregate.
In the US literature, many studies have been conducted in a framework characterized by the application of vector autoregression VAR estimation techniques, which are useful to construct indicators of policy explicitly based on data. The VAR approach was initially applied in studies on the business cycle, 17 but most recent applications have focused on both the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 18 and the identi cation of monetary policy regimes and indexes. 19 The VAR approach used in all these studies is named structural VAR since after the estimation of the unrestricted vector autoregression i.e., with no contemporaneous interactions among the variables, the econometric identi cation of economically meaningful i.e., structural innovations occurs in a second stage where reasonable constraints must be introduced. 19 See Bagliano and Favero 1996 and Rudebusch 1996, respectively, for a comparative evaluation and a critical view on the application of VARs to measuring monetary policy. 20 See Amisano and Giannini 1997, chap. 1. Technically, the estimation of a structural VAR with Choleski decomposition i.e., where the structural innovations are orthogonal and there is a recursive in uence of contemporaneous non-structural innovation on the variables can be done equation by equation with ordinary least squares by using the constraints are typically designed as restrictions on the contemporaneous inuence among fundamental i.e., non-structural and structural innovations, where the latter are assumed to be mutually and serially uncorrelated. 21 Bernanke and Blinder 1992 used fundamental innovations in the FedFunds rate the overnight rate in the market for US bank reserves as an indicator of exogenous monetary policy shocks. 22 They argued that in the past thirty y ears, except for a few periods, the Federal Reserve used changes in this variable to signal to the market a change in the conduct of monetary policy. 23 An extension of the Bernanke and Blinder analysis was undertaken by Sims 1992 , who considered ve di erent countries US, UK, Japan, Germany and France. Sims noticed that positive short-term interest rate innovations led to reductions in both a monetary aggregate and in output in all countries, thus tting the predictions of standard IS-LM type models. However, the response of prices was puzzling, as prices generally increased and strongly in Japan and France even after a commodity price index was included in the VAR. 24 Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992 instead chose innovations in nonborrowed reserves this aggregate is equal to the central-bank money which is not borrowed at the discount window as a measure of US monetary policy. They obtained results which w ere broadly consistent with prior knowledge of properties of a Wold causal chain. 21 Following the original proposal by Sims 1980, many studies have applied a Wold causal ordering of the fundamental innovations. In this case, econometric identi cation hinges uniquely on the ordering of variables in the original VAR in addition to the orthogonality assumption in the structural shocks since the results from a chosen Wold causal ordering are obviously not invariant to the change of variables' positions. In particular, in a W old causal chain variables are included, roughly speaking, in a sort of increasingly endogeneity order", from the most weakly exogenous to the most endogenous one. Hence, the order must re ect an economically meaningful choice. 22 The interpretation of VAR structural innovations as policy shocks does not mean that policymakers act randomly. It only tries to isolate the e ects of various factors" e.g., individual skills of the policymakers, their political bias or possible shifts in preferences, measurement errors, or else not included in the statistical model. See the discussions in Christiano and Evans 1995 and Leeper, Sims and Zha 1996.the e ects of money supply changes on di erent economic variables. 25 Yet, another measure has been proposed by Strongin 1995 , who argued that in the short run the Federal Reserve has really no choice but to accomodate the demand for total reserves, although it can still e ectively implement a contractionary policy by reducing nonborrowed reserves and thus pushing banks to borrow more intensively from the discount window. Accordingly, Strongin's measure is the component of the innovation in nonborrowed reserves that is orthogonal to the innovation in total reserves.
In a recent work, Bernanke and Mihov 1997a showed how it is possible to use a simple model of the market for bank reserves to obtain all the previously proposed indicators of US monetary policy as particular speci cations of a general model that can be tested and evaluated alternatively. The main advantage of this approach is that there is no need to assume, somehow exogenously, that a single variable is the best indicator of the stance of monetary policy. The latter can be directly tested, and it is also possible to compare and evaluate di erent monetary regimes". The statistical tests implied by the use of the di erent indicators take the form of a test of overidentifying restrictions. Finally, the model suggests that is possible to construct a measure of the monetary policy stance which combines di erent pieces of information given by single indicators, by turning to a just-identi ed version of the model. Since our analysis for Italy follows the Bernanke and Mihov approach, we review their methodology in the next subsection.
We conclude our survey of the literature with a brief mention of some recent studies that have focused on monetary policy in Italy. Generally speaking, all the papers that we are aware of, are in the spirit of Bernanke and Blinder 1992 and Sims 1992, i.e. they consider innovations in a shortterm interest rate as an indicator of the monetary policy stance. A rst group of papers aimed at providing some macroeconometric evidence in favour of the existence of a broad credit channel of monetary-policy transmission in Italy. Buttiglione and Ferri 1994 25 See also Eichenbaum 1992 who comments on Sims 1992. 26 The two rates have a practically identical pro le in the recent past. See footnote 33 below. 27 Gaiotti, Gavosto and Grande 1997 is an example of the former analysis; Kim and Roubini 1995, De Arcangelis 1996 and Smets 1996 and 1997 of the latter one. All these studies use a three-month money-market interest rate.
Methodology
As already mentioned section 3.1, both Bernanke and Blinder 1992 and Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992 proposed structural VARs where one policy variable respectively, the Fed Funds rate and nonborrowed reserves is listed last. This ordering is meant to re ect policy endogeneity; however, within the time unit e.g., one month policy variables are not allowed to a ect all the nonpolicy variables e.g., an index of the general price level, an index of output, etc.. Hence, the length of the time unit is crucial for the analysis: the built-in assumption of zero response in the nonpolicy variables can besensibly maintained when the observation period is one month, but it is less acceptable when the time unit is one quarter. In fact, although the standard indirect transmission of monetary policy e ects to output may be slow, it is not possible to exclude some shorter-period e ects due to the role of changes in expectations induced by monetary policy impulses. 28 Bernanke where RL is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L and R0 = I; y t is the vector of nonpolicy variables and p t is the vector of policy variables.
In the estimation of the orthogonalized, economically meaningful structural innovations in the second stage, a recursive causal block-order is assumed from the set of nonpolicy variables to the set of policy variables. Moreover, the recursive causal order is also established for the nonpolicy variables in y t . In terms of the relationship between the fundamental innovations, u y;t and u p;t , and the structural innovations, y;t and p;t , this implies: where A 1;1 is lower-triangular and B 1;1 is diagonal so that there is a Wold recursive causal ordering among the nonpolicy variables in y t . Moreover, 28 These changes in expectations can be responsible for relevant c hanges in consumption and investment decisions of the private sector. 29 Bold lower-case capital letters indicate vectors matrices.
A 2;1 is a full matrix so that there is a Wold block-recursive causal ordering between nonpolicy and policy variables. Building on previous work by Strongin 1995, the vector of policy variables contains aggregates and interest rates characterizing the market for bank reserves. In fact, monetary policy is e ectively conducted through the market for bank reserves where the di erent operating procedures of the central bank can be designed according to appropriate constraints in the relationship between u p;t and p;t . Hence, the core of the analysis focuses on the shape that the matrices A 2;2 and B 2;2 must take for the di erent operating procedures to work properly. This requires linear and nonlinear constraints on the elements of those two matrices. A test for overidentifying restrictions can then be applied to check whether the constraints implied by the di erent regimes are rejected by the data. Moreover, the impulse response functions of policy and nonpolicy variables to monetary shocks are used to further check whether the identi ed monetary-policy innovations can beplausibly quali ed so. 30 4 The Model
The General Setup
In this section we use the empirical framework of section 3.2 to study the conduct of monetary policy in Italy in the 90's. 31 We explicitely focus on the market for bank reserves: di erent monetary regimes are de ned according to the constraints that they imply on the central bank operating procedures 30 As in almost all cases the time series analyzed are nonstationary or quasinonstationary. Most of the studies quoted above either build on the results of Sims, Stock and Watson 1989 and apply traditional stationary asymptotic tests, or assume only quasi-nonstationarity and carry on traditional time series analysis. Issues related to di erencing the time series and considering the possible cointegrating relationships among them are not raised, with very few exceptions Clarida and Gertler, 1996. Strongin explains only in footnote 25 how the method he uses can be viewed as the most conservative" one given the contemporaneous presence of stationary and nonstationary variables. See Juselius, 1997, for a vector error-correction approach t o the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in selected European countries.
Intuitively, when cointegration constraints are neglected in the impulse response analysis, this implies that the long-run responses of some variables are not constrained and can possibly explode. However, the short-run analysis is still valid and the explosive nature of the impulse responses becomes only an empirical question, i.e. whether the horizon chosen to represent the impulse response functions is long enough to show the eventually explosive nature of each quasi-nonstationary variable. 31 Bernanke and Mihov 1997b and Clarida and Gertler 1996 analyzed montary policy in Germany in a similar framework. in this market. At the same time, we let some nonpolicy variables a ect the estimation, although only block-recursively and ordered recursively among each other.
In addition, we extend the previous setup to take i n to account an indicator of the relative price of foreign currencies in the set of variables included in the VAR, viewing Italy as a small open-economy. As a matter of fact, the behavior of the exchange rate greatly a ected both monetary policy management and the performance of the Italian economy Section 2. Accordingly, we added the exchange rate vis-a-vis Germany in the VAR. 32 Following Kim and Roubini 1995 and Clarida and Gertler 1996, we chose to consider the real rather than the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, according to sticky-price models the two rates have an identical pattern in the short run, so that the real exchange rate inherits the jumping assetprice nature of the nominal one. However, the real exchange rate plays a more important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and, therefore, is more informative to study the dynamics of the nonpolicy variables.
In order to include properly the exchange rate into our VAR, observe that its jumping nature prevents us to include it in the nonpolicy-variable block. In fact, this would exclude the contemporaneous reaction of the exchange rate to innovations in the policy variables. In particular, as shown below, this would exclude the contemporaneous reaction of the exchange rate to movements in short-term interest rates; this would not be acceptable according to all traditional exchange rate theories, as well as the simple observation of nancial and foreign exchange markets. At the same time, the real exchange rate is not a policy variable, as it is not under the direct control of the monetary authorities. Therefore, we treat the real exchange rate as a special nonpolicy variable added right after the policy-variable block.
Hence, the relationship among fundamental and structural innovations can besummarized as follows: where u r;t and r;t are respectively the fundamental and structural innovation related to the real exchange rate; a 3;1 and a 3;2 are full row vectors 32 In a four-variable VAR with both short-run and long-run restrictions, Smets 1997 uses the ECU nominal exchange rate in order to estimate the weight of the exchange rate in the reaction functions of the French, German and Italian moentary authorities. and the column vector b 2;3 represents the possible correlations between the structural innovations in the market for bank reserves including a possible monetary policy-induced variable and the structural innovations in the exchange rate.
Given the emphasis on the central bank operating procedures, our analysis is focused on the lower-right corner of the system. This subsystem models the market for bank reserves, similarly to Bernanke and Mihov 1997a and 1997b, and explicitly considers the role of the exchange rate as a jumping variable: 
The Italian Market for Bank Reserves
A c haracterization of the central bank operating procedures requires a precise description of how this market works. In Italy the demand of banks for reserves is positively linked to the level of bank deposits; this is a consequence of both legal reserve requirements and basic strategies of portfolio allocation between risky and safe assets. Quite obviously, the demand for total reserves is also inversely related to money-market interest rates. The rate on overnight loans has become recently the most important rate in this market segment. 33 In terms of innovations the demand for total reserves can be speci ed as: 34 u T R = , u OV + d d 2 where u T R is the innovation in total reserves, u OV is the innovation in the overnight interest rate and d is the unit-variance, orthogonal innovation in the demand for total reserves i.e., an indicator of the shifting in the demand for total reserves; d is a measure of the standard deviation of the structural shock assigned to this equation. 33 Another important i n terest rate is the repo rate. As Fig. 1 shows, the two rates are close-to-perfect substitutes: their degree of correlation in the 90's is 0.95. Even though we use the overnight rate, we h a v e c hecked that the qualitative results of our analysis are not a ected by the alternative c hoice. 34 We omit the time subscript t to ease notation.
The banking system can be nanced by the Bank of Italy through three channels.
Under normal market conditions the most convenient source of funding is represented by the credit line Anticipazioni Ordinarie that banks can activate with the Bank of Italy. This provides a limited amount of low-cost nance for banks' cash needs. In particular, banks pay the discount rate tasso u ciale di sconto, usually a oor for money market rates, on the amount of credit e ectively drawn from this line. On a regular basis the Bank of Italy launches open-market often shortterm and reversed transactions to either inject or withdraw liquidity i n the market. These transactions occur via regulated, competitive auctions and represent the most relevant tool for monetary policy management.
Finally, an explicit standing facility is provided by means of xed-term advances Anticipazioni a Scadenza Fissa that can beautomatically drawn by banks and on which a penalty rate is applied. 35 This ceiling" rate in the money market is established by the central bank analogously to the discount rate. The two o cial interest rates de ne a corridor that normally contains the every-day uctuations of all other moneymarket rates. The total amount of bank reserves can then be partitioned in the sum of two aggregates that we de ne, in line with the US literature, as borrowed and nonborrowed reserves. We only de ne xed-term advances as borrowed reserves, thus including Anticipazioni Ordinarie and all open-market operations in the nonborrowed reserves. This is motivated by the fact that Anticipazioni Ordinarie: a are of limited amount, established by the central bank; b should rationally be used rst as the least-costly source of nance; 36 and c can in principle be cancelled by the Bank of Italy with short notice. 37 In terms of innovations, the demand for xed-term advances can beexpressed as a positive function of the spread between the overnight rate and the rate on xed-term advances: 35 These xed-term advances are similar to Lombard loans in Germany. 36 In reality, though, this credit line is never completely used since many cash managers keep a portion of the line as a bu er stock. However, the unused credit is quantitatively negligible. 37 Similar choice was made in Bernanke and Mihov 1997b for Germany.
where u F T A is the innovation in the xed-term advances and u i F T A is the innovation in the interest rate on xed-term advances; b is a unit-variance, orthogonal shock related to the borrowed-reserves component i.e., a measure of the shift in the demand for xed-term advances and b is the standard deviation of the structural shock related to this equation. As already noticed, the rate on xed-term advances has always been changed discretely and according to monetary-policy decisions during the period under investigation. Therefore, we set u i F T A =0and consider only innovations in the overnight i n terest rate as a determinant of the demand for xed-term advances. 38 The central-bank direct intervention in the market for bank reserves can bemodelled by specifying its supply of nonborrowed reserves, namely: establishes that its innova- 38 The same strategy, with respect to the discount rate, has been applied by Bernanke and Mihov 1997a in their study of US monetary policy. Alternatively, Bernanke and Mihov 1997b considered an additional equation for the rate on xed-term advances when studying German monetary policy. As we will discuss in Section 5, the limited numberof degrees of freedoms in our VAR convinced us to save one equation and take the present, more parsimonious approach. 39 In our de nition, an increase decrease in the exchange rate represents a real depreciation appreciation of the Lira with respect to the DM. The order condition for the identi cation of the complete VAR model is violated since 21 variances and covariances are available from the rst stage of the estimation and these are not su cient to obtain the 23 parameters included in the structural form, whose lower-right corner is 6. Identi cation can be achieved by imposing appropriate constraints that re ect di erent operating procedures of monetary policy. We describe four possible monetary regimes based on these operating procedures and thereby obtain four di erent models that we estimate and evaluate in Section 5. One of these models is based on the overnight rate, while the others are quantity-based regimes.
1 OV Regime. In this policy regime the monetary authorities o set all exogenous shifts in the market for bank reserves i.e., all the structural innovations d and b so as to control the overnight rate. In terms of parameter constraints this means that d = 1 and b = ,1. Moreover, the authorities are also assumed not to allow the supply of nonborrowed reserves to respond to innovations in the exchange rate: i.e., r = 0. Therefore, eq. | is motivated by viewing banks' demand for xed-term advances which is the most costly source of bank nance as arising only because of liquidity mismanagement in the short run; hence, = 0. 41 Moreover, because of the ceiling on money-market interest rates represented by the rate on xed-term advances, the monetary authorities are assumed not to respond to innovations in the demand for total reserves i.e., d = 0. In fact, under normal circumstances, interest-rate volatility i s naturally limited by the corridor bands. Then, by maintaining the hypothesis of no in uence of the 40 Observe that the indicator is the component of the innovation in nonborrowed reserves that is orthogonal to the innovation in the demand for total reserves. Given the di erent institutional settings of the US and the Italian market for bank reserves, we do not view this indicator as particularly informative for Italy. 41 Instead, the demand for total reserves is interest-rate elastic as in the rst two regimes.
exchange rate innovation on the decision of the monetary authorities i.e., r = 0, we get: 42 u N B R , b u F T A = s s
All the described regimes are overidenti ed. In addition, we analyze three just-identi ed structures that can bederived from the general setup. They plausibly combine some characteristics of the models above without incurring in the violation of the rank condition. 43 5 Just-identi ed model 1 JI1. We rst consider the natural extension to our framework of the just-identi ed model proposed by Bernanke and Mihov 1997a. For this purpose we assume an inelastic demand for total reseves = 0 and no ability of the monetary authorities to o set any orthogonalized innovation in the exchange rate r = 0.
6 Just-identi ed model 2 JI2. We k eep = 0 and replace r = 0 with the assumption of no e ect of innovations in the demand for total reserves on innovations in the exchange rate T R = 0.
7 Just-identi ed model 3 JI3. Here we replace = 0 with = 0 coherently with the contruction of the NBR FTA regime. We also maintain T R = 0 a s in JI2.
In these just-identi ed models, the estimated indicator of the exogenous monetary policy shocks is a combination of the measures obtained for the four previously de ned regimes. 42 Notice the simmetry of the following equation in the text with the estimated monetarypolicy measure of the previous regime. 43 For a discussion on the rank condition in VAR models see Hamilton 1994 and Amisano and Giannini 1997. As natural just-identi ed versions of the models proposed above, we rst tried all four models above without the zero constraint on r i.e., the monetary authorities are free to o set orthogonalized innovations in the exchange rate. Although the order condition is satis ed, all those structures are not identi ed according to the rank condition.
Data, Estimation and Results
In Section 2 we underlined that the Italian money market reached a fullydeveloped stage only in the late 80's. 44 This institutional characteristic led us to limit our analysis to the period between June 1989 and November 1996, the month in which the Lira rejoined the ERM. As the estimation period is not very long, the numberof degrees of freedom is limited.
All data are monthly. As discussed in Section 3.2, the choice of the observation time unit is part of the identi cation procedure since some recursive causal links among the blocks of the VAR are not very plausible when switching to lower-frequency data.
The variables included in the VAR are from top to bottom: the consumer price index and the industrial production index as nonpolicy variables; total bank reserves, xed-term advances and the overnight interest rate as policy variables; nally, the real exchange rate between Italy and Germany as the last variable. Many studies in the VAR literature include a price commodity index. This is usually motivated by the need to deal with the price puzzle" Sims, 1992 . However, we decided to limit the number of nonpolicy variables in order to save degrees of freedom. The price index, the industrial production index and the real exchange rate have been logtransformed. Total reserves and xed-term advances have been normalized by dividing them by the 18-month past moving average of total reserves in order to use the level relationship among total reserves, xed-term advances and nonborrowed reserves. 45 Since the Italian banking system experienced some relevant changes in the reserve requirement ratios in the sample period, we used the adjusted series for total bank reserves o ered by the Bank of Italy. The overnight rate is in levels. Further details on the data are given in the Appendix.
The number of lags employed in the estimation is six. In fact, six lags seem to be su cient to correct for the serial correlation in the residuals. This is suggested by both the Godfrey test on the correlation coe cients and the graphs of the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the residuals. The use of nine lags perform slightly better in terms of the Hannan-Quinn and Schwartz information criteria. However, given the limited span of the sample, we were concerned with the loss of degrees of freedom. 46 Estimation is based on the full-information maximum likelihood method. Table 2 reports estimation results for both the full sample and the subsample after the exit of the Italian Lira from the ERM. 47 Table 3 shows the robustness of the results to the use of nine lags in the full-sample estimation.
As a general assessment of the plausibility of the model, all the coe cients show signs which are coherent with the underlying theoretical assumptions. The only exception is the estimated parameter of the demand for total reserves i.e., that has the wrong sign in some regimes; however, when this occurs, is not signi cant a t the standard 95 probability level.
The main conclusion derived from the estimation results is that the OV regime seems to be the most appropriate characterization of the Bank of Italy's operating procedures and targets. This seems to be valid not only in the full sample, but also in the 1993 96 subsample characterized by the free oating of the Lira see the second part of Table 2 . 48 Hence, even though the role of the exchange rate varies from being an intermediate target to only working as a transmission channel, there is no evidence of a change in the monetary policy operating procedures.
Our selection of the OV regime is motivated by the following considerations. First, in the full sample the test for overidentifying restrictions selects only two regimes out of the four proposed: the OV and the NBR TR regimes. However, the latter is characterized by a higher response of the demand for xed-term advances to innovations in the overnight rate. As this rate is usually below the administratively-set rate on xed-term advances, the demand for this costly source of bank nancing usually depends mostly on mistakes in liquidity-need forecasts and or other possible forms of mismanagement b y banks. Accordingly, w e consider a lower value for as being more plausible.
Second, when we turn to the di erent just-identi ed versions of the model, the estimated values of the policy parameters, d and b , are not statistically di erent from the restrictions implied by the OV regime, but they do not support the constraint o n b imposed by the NBR TR regime. 49 Finally, the 46 As we show below, the qualitative results of the estimation do not change when choosing nine lags instead of six see Table 3 . 47 For this subsample we h a v e used four lags in order to save degrees of freedom. Four lags are however su cient to get well-behaved residuals. We do not report results for the just-identi ed structures since they showed convergence problems due to the low n umber of observations. 48 See also Smets 1997. Although the author claims that the nominal ECU exchange rate was important in the reaction function of the Bank of Italy between 1980 and 1996, the weight of this variable was not found to be statistically signi cant i n the post-EMS period. 49 Notice also that when the policy parameter linked to the innovations on the exchange simulation exercise given by the impulse response analysis provides further support to the OV regime with respect to all other regimes. 50 In Fig. 2 w e plot the impulse response functions IRF for the OV regime. After a monetary contraction, output falls signi cantly and the slowdown lasts for more than one year. The price level shows an initial price puzzle" and then falls signi cantly for about a year and a half starting from the fth month. The real exchange rate is only signi cantly a ected at the time the monetary contraction takes place; the resulting depreciation does not rate r is estimated, it is never signi cantly di erent from zero. 50 All impulse response functions have been constructed by designing a restrictive monetary shock leading to a 150 basis-point increase in the overnight rate for all the monetary regimes. Responses in output, prices and the exchange rate are percent deviations from the corresponding variables' values before the shock. Dashed-line bands refer to the 95 con dence interval and are computed by the delta method Hamilton, 1994, and Amisano and Giannini, 1997. conform to the prediction of the uncovered interest-rate parity condition. The IRF of all the other regimes are instead not so satisfactory. In particular, following the same monetary contraction, output responses are much less statistically signi cant, while prices show either a persistent increase or a never-signi cant reduction see Fig. 3 .
The last three rows in the rst part of Table 2 report the estimated parameters for the three just-identi ed models. As already noticed, they all support our selection of OV as the most suitable monetary regime in the sample. All the freely-estimated policy parameters con rm the constraints imposed by assuming that the central bank controls the overnight rate. In Fig. 4 w e plot the IRF corresponding to our standardized monetary contraction for the JI3 structure where = 0 and T R = 0. Notice that they are very similar to the IRF of the OV regime. For the other two just-identi ed models, instead, the response of prices not shown here is never signi cantly decreasing, as in the three quantity-based regimes analyzed above. Last, we present the IRF to a 5 real depreciation for the OV regime in Fig. 5 . Prices rise immediately and persistently after the depreciation, while a positive steady e ect on output is observed after six months. 51 Money-market interest rates signi cantly decrease in the period right after the exchange-rate devaluation. Indeed, two interpretations are possible according to di erent views of the central bank's behavior. First, as the overnight rate is a policy variable, this may imply that the central bank simply accomodates the external shock and, contrary to the monetary discipline argument, sustains an expansion of the economy led by exports. Second, the central bank might behave more rigorously and want to react to depreciations by restricting monetary conditions. In this case, the plotted response of the interest rate is puzzling. However, a plausible explanation may be that the foreign exchange market is actually anticipating the domestic monetary expansion resulting from the interest-rate response of Fig. 5 . In other words, this kind of depreciation puzzle" can be explained, similarly to the price puzzle in Sims 1992 , by assuming that the information set of the market is larger than the information set in the statistical model. This argument, however, deserves further investigation. We now turn to an application of the estimated model.
A Measure of the Monetary Policy Stance in Italy
The analysis developed in the previous section suggests that the control of the overnight rate was the e ective monetary target of the Bank of Italy in the 90's. This implies that the overnight rate can beregarded as a reliable monetary policy indicator, and its innovations as plausible exogenous monetary policy shocks.
In this section we use our framework to derive an overall measure of the monetary policy stance in Italy. Then, we compare this measure with both conventional wisdom and a monetary condition index MCI. The latter is a weighted average of the changes in the real interest rate and the percentage change in the real e ective exchange rate, which has been recently used by central banks and international organizations as an indicator of either the monetary policy stance or in ationary pressures. 52 In order to derive our indicator, we turn to a particular just-identi ed version the JI3 structure of the model instead of using the OV regime. The rationale is that just-identi ed structures are more exible and allow us to obtain free estimates of the parameters associated to all the policy variables and the exchange rate in the reaction function. As a matter of fact, controlling the overnight rate might not be the exclusive operating target of the monetary authorities. Just-identi ed models allow us to take into account such a possibility as, by construction, they do not exclude a priori the e ect of other variables in the reaction function.
We decided to use the JI3 model as it shows a good performance in terms of impulse response functions and allows for a non-zero contemporaneous policy reaction to real exchange-rate shocks.
In our framework a measure of the monetary policy stance can be obtained by using the estimated submatrices, A LR and B LR , of the original system eq. 1. These matrices link structural and non-structural innovations in the policy section of the VAR. In fact, consider the projection of the vector of policy innovations plus the one in the exchange rate on the nonpolicy innovations. By premultiplying this projection by B ,1 LR A LR , the policy structural innovations can beobtained. Following Bernanke and Mihov 1997a, the same matrix can then be used to linearly combine the policy variables and the exchange rate. We thus obtain the following new vector of variables: By construction one element of this vector has innovations that are closely related to the structural policy innovations, s . 53 We then consider this linear combination of all policy variables and the exchange rate as the indicator of the policy stance.
In order to be able to evaluate periods in which monetary policy was approximately neutral, tight or easy, w e normalize the indicator by subtracting its 18-month past moving average from the level. This means that a closeto-zero value of the normalized indicator corresponds to a monetary stance that is neutral" with respect to the previous 18-month average.
In Fig. 6 we have plotted our measure of the monetary policy stance for the entire period under investigation. In the same graph we have drawn the Italian MCI derived by Grande 1997. 54 This is based on analogous indexes developed for other countries. 55 It is evident that our measure is perfectly able to capture the two major monetary restrictions in the sample. These occurred in Summer 1992, right before the EMS crisis, and in Spring 1995, when again the o cial interest 53 More precisely, it is the element of that vector corresponding to the position of s in the vector of policy shocks i.e., position second-to-the-last according to eq. 6. The estimated indicator I t is: I t = 0 : 06T R t , 0 : 44F T A t + 1 : 11OV t + 1 3 : 07r t where T R t are total reserves, F T A t are xed-term advances, OV t is the overnight rate and r t is the log of the real exchange rate vis-a-vis Germany. Total reserves and xed-term advances are normalized as described in Section 5. 54 Notice that the Italian MCI has been di erently normalized by considering deviations from the 1993 second-semester value. As a consequence, only a dynamic comparison is possible.
55 See Freedman 1993. rates were raised to counterbalance the exchange rate depreciation and the resurging in ationary pressures. These two monetary restrictions correspond to the shaded areas in the graph. It is also evident that the MCI fails to highlight the second episode.
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Our measure begins to show an opposite pattern with respect to the MCI even before the second major episode of monetary contraction. Actually, only is our indicator able to explain the monetary policy turn to a more restrictive stance beginning in Summer 1994.
The reason why our measure and the MCI behave so di erently in the last part of the sample is obviously explained by their constructions. The MCI assigns to percentage changes in the real e ective exchange rate a weight equal to approximately 1 3, and to changes in the real interest rate a weight equal to 1. These weights are obtained by estimating the impact of the two variables on real aggregate demand according to economy-wide structural models. On the contrary, our indicator is derived in the context of a model that explicitly focuses on the monetary policy operating procedures.
Therefore, in addition to the interest rate and the exchange rate, our measure includes other important variables, such as bank reserves, which may help de ne the e ective monetary conditions in the economy. The weight o f e a c h policy variable is obtained by direct estimation of our structural VAR.
Concluding Remarks
We h a v e presented an empirical model of the management of monetary policy in Italy based on a methodology recently developed in the US literature. This approach combines structural VAR estimation with an emphasis given to the institutional setting in which monetary policy is actually implemented. In particular, the identi cation of the model relies on particular restrictions that de ne the central bank's operating procedures in the market for bank reserves.
The main conclusion is that the control of the interest rate on overnight loans can be considered as the most appropriate targeting regime of monetary policy management in Italy. This result seems to hold for the entire period under investigation 1989 1996 as well as in the subsample related to the free oating of the Italian Lira after the exit from the ERM in Fall 1992. As a consequence, the model implies that innovations in the overnight rate can beinterpreted as a good proxy of exogenous monetary policy shocks.
However, a measure of the general monetary policy stance cannot be based on the level and dynamics of the overnight rate alone since the latter is a ected by both demand and supply shocks in the market for reserves. Therefore, we derive an indicator of the monetary conditions by considering those variables in the VAR that are relevant for monetary policy management. The proposed measure is a linear combination of these variables with weights given by the parameters already estimated in the structural model. The constructed indicator is able to highlight the two major monetary restrictions in the sample and shows a pattern in line with conventional views on recent monetary trends in Italy.
Several issues may be addressed within this framework in the future. First, it would be desirable to use higher frequency data to check robustness of the results. This is motivated by the fact that open-market operations are usually conducted on a weekly basis. Obviously this would also require higher-frequency series for prices and economic activity. A second, more demanding, challenge is to disentangle the di erent components of nonborrowed reserves and model monetary interventions more thoroughly. Third, the identi ed exogenous monetary shocks can be used to investigate the transmission of monetary impulses to bank lending and deposit rates, as well as to the
